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Abstract

Objective: The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between hospital
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given
hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. Structural
characteristics included hospital type, case mix index, average daily census, bed size,
ownership, disproportionate share percentage, location, and American Nurses Credentialing
Center Magnet status. The secondary objective of the study was to determine whether a
hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. These objectives were achieved
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using 4 publicly available
data sources. Background: The intention of pay-for-performance programs, including the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid HAC Reduction Program, is to improve the quality of care
delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and
their efficacy in improving care are widely debated. This study was designed to address the gap
in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means of motivating
providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality. Results: Higher average daily
census, disproportionate share percentage, and case mix index were associated with increased
likelihood of receiving a penalty in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately half (49%) of
who did not experience a penalty at all improved their Total HAC Score. 51% of hospitals with 1
year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty
improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with 3 years of penalty improved their Total
HAC Score. Conclusions: Despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to
avoid penalty, the vast majority of hospitals improved their performance over time. This finding
holds promise for value-based reimbursement as a means for improving HAC incidence.
Keywords: pay for performance, healthcare associated infections, healthcare quality
indicators, organization and administration
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Dissertation Introduction

The title of this dissertation is, “Hospital Characteristics Associated with HAC Reduction
Program Payment Penalties across Program Years.” This study will be a secondary data
analysis using numerous publicly available datasets. A grant proposal will serve as the
dissertation proposal for Chapters I-III, using the NIH SF424 form for R01 applications as a
guide for content and page limits. Chapters IV and Chapter V will be Findings and Discussion &
Conclusions, a manuscript for submission to Quality Management in Healthcare will explore and
discuss the research findings. Chapter VI will be the Concluding Narrative, with additional
information on the Results and Discussion due to the page limitation of the manuscript.
The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural
characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction
Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's
penalization status (penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program
years is related to quality performance (Total HAC Score). In the manuscript, these aims will be
referred to as “objectives” so that the manuscript is submission-ready. The study findings will
contribute to a growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of value-based
reimbursement in quality improvement and measurement. To this end, the study will explore
how organizational structural characteristics contribute to success and failure in quality
measures in a well-known, high-stakes, national pay-for-performance program.
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Specific Aims

Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are a growing issue in healthcare that harms patients
and leads to the extension or complication of care, increased healthcare costs, disability, and
even death (Pittet & Donaldson, 2006). The HAC Reduction Program is a budget-neutral
penalty-only program, existing among several Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) payfor-performance structures offering incentives, or upside risk, such as Value-Based Purchasing
(VBP) and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2017c). The intention of the pay-for-performance programs is to
improve the quality, and therefore value, of care delivered; however, the theoretical and
conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and the conclusiveness of their efficacy is
widely debated (de Bruin, Baan, & Struijs, 2011; Eijkenaar, Emmert, Scheppach, & Schöffski,
2013; Emmert, Eijkenaar, Kemter, Esslinger, & Schöffski, 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson
et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010). For the HAC Reduction Program the intention is to reduce
preventable harm to patients (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).
In the HAC Reduction Program hospital performance is assessed using both Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) hospitalacquired infections (HAI). More specifically, the AHRQ Patient Safety Composite measure (PSI90) and the CDC/NHSN HAI central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), catheterassociated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), surgical site infections (SSI), methicillin-resistant
staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteremia, and C. difficile laboratory-identified events are used
to create an overall score.
Cross-sectional studies have found that some hospital structural characteristics contribute
substantially to financial penalty in the CMS HAC Reduction Program: hospitals that have 400
or more beds, are academic, have a level I trauma center, have a higher case mix index (CMI),
or have safety net status are more frequently penalized (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al.,
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2015; Soltoff, Koenig, Demehin, Foster, & Vaz, 2018). Additional structural characteristics,
including DSH percentage, teaching status, Medicare and Medicaid patient volume, nurse
staffing level, profit status, and Joint Commission accreditation, have demonstrated an inverse
relationship to performance in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing
(VBP) (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller, Goldfield, Averill, & Hughes, 2017; Koenig et al., 2016;
Rajaram et al., 2015). Because not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction
Program are scored in every measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b), larger hospitals that have higher volumes of qualifying
patients and procedures and also care for a higher proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged
populations, disproportionately receive penalty status (Rajaram et al., 2015).
Although research has been conducted examining hospital characteristics as they relate to
various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah et al., 2012;
Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), there is a gap
in research related to how hospitals fare in the program year-to-year. Unlike previous crosssectional studies (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), this study will
explore hospital structural characteristics as related to both penalty status and HAC
performance, across program years.
The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any
given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The null hypothesis is that there
is no significant difference in the characteristics of hospitals penalized in the HAC Reduction
Program in years FY 2015 to FY 2018.
The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status (penalized
or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to quality
performance (Total HAC Score). The null hypothesis is that there is no significant association
between Total HAC Score and penalty status across years. This study will use a repeated
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measures analysis of variance to achieve the aims. The results from this study will inform a
growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means
of motivating providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality.
Background and Significance
This study is guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of care: structure, process, and
outcome (Donabedian, 1988), but also informed by the tenets of agency theory, behavioral
economics, and value theory as these are the theoretical basis for the pay for performance and
VBP programs.
Economic and Behavioral Theories Underlying Value-Based Reimbursement
Agency theory. Value-based reimbursement is based on the economic theory of agency,
which describes the payment arrangement or relationship between a principal (the patient, for
example) and an agent (a provider’s organization, for example) (Conrad, 2015). Agency theory
describes this principal-agent relationship as a “contract” whereby the ideal would involve the
agent, or provider, delivering the most efficient care possible, delivering quality by using as few
resources as possible, and maximizing principal (patient) well-being (Dranove & White, 1987).
Agency theory is supported by behavioral economics, which integrates economic theory with the
contribution of human factors to healthcare quality (Jack Stevens, 2017).
Behavioral economics. Behavioral economics shows great potential for integration in
quality and safety research, as the literature encourages incremental behavioral changes
realistic for healthcare providers to drive change and make meaningful improvements (Jack
Stevens, 2017). Himmelstein, Ariely, and Woolhandler state, “while higher pay clearly increases
performance for straightforward manual tasks such as installing windshields (Lazear, 1996), a
growing body of evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology indicates that
rewards sometimes undermine motivation and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks,
especially when intrinsic motivation is high” (Himmelstein, Ariely, & Woolhandler, 2014a, p.
203). Himmelstein et al. (2014a) explain that pay-for-performance operates on the assumption
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that performance can be accurately ascertained, more detailed contracts will improve quality,
variation in care is attributed to variation in performance, financial incentives add to motivation,
and that hospitals or providers not meeting quality standards deserve fewer resources.
Behavioral economics draws on the work of Skinner (1953), who was a thought leader in the
science of human behavior and wrote about the effects of reward and punishment on
individuals’ conduct. Not only did Skinner find that rewards positively reinforced good behavior,
but he also found punishment important to establishing conditions that would be conducive to
avoiding a certain behavior (Skinner, 1953). At face value, Skinner’s work (1953) provides
support for the theory of pay-for-performance in quality programs: if an individual or organization
is behaving well (delivering standard or above-standard quality of care), they should receive
additional resources as a reward in order to promote the positive behavior. Similarly, punishing
hospitals for poor performance by either withholding incentives or issuing financial penalty has
been thought to condition hospitals to provide better care. Skinner was not an organizational
theorist, however, and much of his research involved basic human tasks instead of complex
medical care delivered in dynamic, volatile, healthcare institutions. Therefore, the evidence and
merit surrounding pay-for-performance as a way of improving healthcare quality is questionable
(Himmelstein et al., 2014a).
Value theory. Value theory is very similar to axiology, which concerns itself with the study of
what things are “good” and to what degree they are good (Shroeder, 2016). Shroeder (2016)
explains that some, such as philosopher Immanuel Kant, might have held human life as having
limitless value; however, in more modern perspectives, life has been widely categorized as an
example of incommensurability of values, meaning no single value can be placed on it
universally. From this point of view, the value of human life is higher if it is at risk of being taken,
but lower if the aim is preserving it (Shroeder, 2016).
Maguire (2016) extrapolates the value theory to a value-based theory of reasons: the weight
of the reason to perform a certain action hinges upon the value achieved by the outcome. In
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healthcare, the outcomes of saving a life or improving well-being, are heavily weighted reasons
for performing an action, and can explain why healthcare providers might be intrinsically
motivated to make behavioral modifications in order to do such actions. This predicates a vague
understanding of value in healthcare, how performance can be extrinsically motivated, and how
healthcare can or should measure the value, or amount of “good” being provided to patients.
The amount of “good” is synonymous with quality, which healthcare quality trailblazer Avedis
Donabedian (1966) describes as taking many different forms for different individuals, but
measured primarily by the outcome of the care delivered.
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
This study is guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of care: structure, process, and
outcome (Donabedian, 1988). Structure accounts for the care setting; process considers the
actual steps in care administration; and outcome takes into account the effects of the care
delivered on a patient’s overall health status (Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian introduced that
economic efficiency, or valuation, be considered in quality improvement and proposed that
practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare improvements, as increased cost will not
always lead to an equal increase in the quality of care (Donabedian, 1966).
The transition to higher quality and lower costs by holding providers accountable is
challenged conceptually by issues surrounding provider practices, clinical systems, payment
models, and managerial systems (Mkanta, Katta, Basireddy, English, & Mejia de Grubb, 2016),
all of which are examples of structure as defined by Donabedian (1966). Value-based
reimbursement for hospitals has proliferated ahead of fully developed healthcare system
structures to accommodate it. For example, the prevalence of fee-for-service and capitation
models in the healthcare market continues to promote volume over value (Miller, 2009).
Therefore, some healthcare systems and providers are reluctant to adapt to the team-based
care required of value-based practices (Mkanta et al., 2016). In addition, there is insufficient
availability of relevant data that allow for comprehensive monitoring of the quality of care across
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the continuum. This is a key component of defining value in healthcare (Mkanta et al., 2016). In
summary, the impact of value-based reimbursement on care, costs, and outcomes remains
poorly understood (Mkanta et al., 2016); however, structure and outcome are intrinsically linked
(Donabedian, 1966).
In the proposed work, structural variables include: hospital type (acute care, critical access,
children’s), volume of discharges, ownership (proprietary, non-profit, government owned, or
otherwise), geographical location, and American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC) Magnet
accreditation status. Processes related to the proposed research will not be measurable using
publicly reported/available data. While evidence-based infection and complication prevention
processes will not be investigated in this research, an organization’s structural characteristics
can be key to implementing strategies for improving processes, and thus patient outcomes such
as HACs (Donabedian, 1966). This study will examine the relationship between structural
variables and penalty status in the HAC Reduction Program, then examine the Total HAC Score
(the summary score of HAC outcomes measures) across program years. This conceptual
framework is depicted in Figure 1.
Various hospital structural characteristics have demonstrated significant relationships with
level of quality measured in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing
(Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). The
infrastructure and resources provided by an organization are key to creating quality and value in
healthcare (Mkanta et al., 2016); however, pay-for-performance structures are lacking
conclusive or supportive evidence as tools for meaningful and sustainable quality improvements
(de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016;
Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010). In this study, associations will be explored
between structural characteristics that may influence processes, which in turn, could impact
quality care outcomes as measured in the CMS HAC Reduction Program.
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• Hospital Characteristics:
• Hospital type
• Case mix index
• Admission Volume
• Bed Size
• Ownership
• DSH Adjustment
• Location
• ANCC Magnet® Designation

Structure

Process

• Adherence to best practices for HAC
prevention

Outcome

• Penalty Status (Yes/No)
• Total HAC Score:
• CAUTI in ICU and Select Wards
• CLABSI in ICU and Select Wards
• SSI Colorectal Surgery
• SSI Hysterectomy
• C. Difficile
• MRSA
• PSI-90

Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the proposed research.
Note. DSH = Disproporationate share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAI = Hospital Acquired Condition; CAUTI =
Catheter-associated urinary tract infection; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; SSI = Surgical site infection;
MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus; PSI = Patient Safety Indicator.

Scientific Premise & Background
The patient safety implications, contribution to inpatient morbidity and mortality, and financial
burden of HACs have long been recognized. HACs have reduced considerably over the past ten
years through various programs and efforts by various federal agencies, such as those by the
Department of Health and Human Services, AHRQ, and the CDC (Bysshe et al., 2017). Despite
having made significant progress, HACs continue to be costly both financially and to human
quality of life, and the inclusion of HACs in the transition from fee-for-service to value-based
reimbursement has further increased interest in accurately measuring, quantifying, and reducing
HACs (Bysshe et al., 2017). Section 3008 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) established the
CMS HAC Reduction Program beginning with FY 2015 hospital discharges (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016a). The program was developed with the intention of
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reducing preventable infections and complications, which include both AHRQ PSIs and CDC
NHSN HAIs.
Evidence suggests that structural characteristics of hospitals influence penalty status in the
CMS HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018).
Not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction Program are scored in every
measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2017b). This contributes to disproportionate penalty of larger hospitals that have
higher volumes of qualifying patients and procedures. These financial penalties may harm the
economic health of larger hospitals, which are also the hospitals that care for a higher
proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged populations (Rajaram et al., 2015). Thus penalties
may add to the high financial burden of caring for poor communities, and even threaten
hospitals’ ability to survive and continue to provide access to disadvantaged populations (Fos,
2017). Healthcare disparities and access to care for low-income patients could be worsened as
a result of penalties in pay-for-performance structures (Fos, 2017). It is noteworthy that while
HACs included in the HAC Reduction Program are risk adjusted, they are not adjusted for
socioeconomic status (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017; Dudeck, Aponte,
Arcement, & Patel, 2017; McIlvennan, Eapen, & Allen, 2015).
HAC Reduction Program Methodology
HAC Reduction Program scores are determined for each hospital based on risk-adjusted
performance, which is then compared to national performance, in two domains. Domain 1 is
worth 15% of the Total HAC Score and is comprised of PSI-90 only; Domain 2 is worth 85% of
the Total HAC Score and is comprised of six NHSN indicators: CAUTI and CLABSI for ICUs and
select wards (medical and/or surgical units) and SSI associated with hysterectomy and
colorectal surgery (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). While NHSN
mandates surveillance on many different HAIs, this subset was selected for public reporting in
the CMS Inpatient Quality Reporting Program and, subsequently, the HAC Reduction Program
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(CDC, n.d.). Program methodology is further described in Figure 2.

Figure 2. HAC Reduction Program Scoring Methodology (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2017b).
Note. PSI = Patient Safety Indicator; HAI = Hospital Acquired Infection; CAUTI = Catheter-associated urinary tract infection; CLABSI
= Central line-associated bloodstream infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus;
CDI = C. Difficile Infection; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition.

Hospitals in the HAC Reduction Program are assigned a Total HAC Score, as well as
Winsorized z-scores for each measure. Higher Total HAC Scores indicate poor overall HAC
performance. Based on performance across all individual HAC measures, the lowest quartile of
Total HAC Score performance is the threshold above/below which a hospital is penalized
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). The HAC Reduction Program requires
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to penalize hospitals that are in the lowest quartile
of national performance. Hospitals with a Total HAC Score that is greater than the threshold are
subject to payment reduction. Thresholds vary year-to-year based on overall nationwide
performance. Incentives are not provided to hospitals that have Total HAC Scores above the
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lowest quartile. Measures in both domains follow AHRQ and NHSN standard specifications,
respectively. HAIs are represented and scored using the risk-adjusted standardized infection
ratio (SIR) for each measure in the HAC Reduction Program (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2017b).
Domain 1 is comprised of Version 6.0.2 of the PSI-90 Patient Safety Composite (15% of
program performance), which contains a total of 10 PSI measures, the components of which are
detailed in Figure 3 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016b). These PSIs provide
information on potential in hospital complications and adverse events following surgeries,
procedures, and childbirth (AHRQ, n.d.). PSIs entail very complex specifications, as they are
derived completely from administrative data and are therefore a classification of International
Classification of Disease (ICD-9 and ICD10) codes into medical conditions. PSIs are intended to
“identify potential adverse events that might need further study; provide the opportunity to
assess the incidence of adverse events and in hospital complications using administrative data
found in the typical discharge record; include indicators for complications occurring in hospital
that may represent patient safety events; and indicators also have area level analogs designed
to detect patient safety events on a regional level” (AHRQ, n.d.).
NHSN specifications are used in the HAC Reduction Program to identify cases eligible for
reporting and scoring in Domain 2 (85% of program performance). CAUTI, CLABSI, MRSA, SSI,
and C. difficile are all HACs surveilled through NHSN. A summary of NHSN specifications for
each measure can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 3. Changes to the PSI-90 Safety Composite Metric in detail (Fontana & Hawes, 2017).
Note. PSI = Patient Safety Indicator. CRBSI = catheter-related bloodstream infection; PE = pulmonary embolism; DVT = deep vein
thrombosis.

Measurement error. Both PSIs and HAIs are clearly defined, but are still subject to
occasional methodological updates. While this sometimes benefits patients, providers, and
consumers (risk adjustment updates that better capture the complexity and risk factors of the
population, for example), it can create confusion and lack consistency desired for comparing
performance year-to-year. Although this is a consideration, the hospitals included in the HAC
Reduction Program equally potentially influenced by similar challenges; hence, further
investigation is needed to determine how methodological changes in measurement and scoring
impact hospital penalty status.
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While many agree that measuring the incidence and impact of HACs is a worthy cause,

HAC measurement has been scrutinized in its current form since it was introduced as a key
component of pay-for-performance (Bysshe et al., 2017). The inclusion of HAC measures in
both VBP and the HAC Reduction Program to-date is intended to emphasize the importance
reducing preventable negative outcomes that impact the quality of life for patients; however, the
validity of HACs as performance measures has been controversial (Calderon, Kavanagh, &
Rice, 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al., 2016). Variability in HAI surveillance practices
(Rau, 2016), for example, hospitals with a robust infection surveillance program will count more
infections, and therefore unfairly penalizing them for identifying more infections compared to
hospitals with less robust programs (Rau, 2016), and the sole reliance of PSIs on administrative
data (Bysshe et al., 2017) are central to HAC measurement controversy. Issues of poor
methodological reliability can lead to the inaccurate designation of a hospital as a poor
performer, which, in turn, results in financial penalty for hospitals that are not poor performers
(Soltoff et al., 2018).
Finally, over the years the HAC Reduction Program has been in place, outcome measures
have seen numerous modifications: for example, CAUTI and CLABSI both changed from
reporting only SIR to infections identified in ICUs and select wards in FY 2018 (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Likewise, PSI-90 saw major changes in FY 2018
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016b) shifting from version 5.0.1 to 6.0.1 in
2017, meaning that the measurement of outcomes in the HAC Reduction Program lacks
consistency across years. These changes are detailed in Figure 3. The changes include
additions, removals, and re-specification of several PSIs which pose an overwhelming challenge
for hospitals who wish to reduce infections and avoid financial penalty.
In addition, HACs lack sensitivity and precision in the measurement of nursing practice, as
they capture only a small portion of nursing care and dismiss fundamental components of the
doctrine of profession of nursing, such as symptom management (Jones, 2016). Therefore,
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measurement error is an important consideration to the interpretation of HAC Reduction
Program scoring and public reporting.
Importance and Improvements to Current Knowledge
The most widely recognized and mandated pay-for-performance programs are the CMS
hospital pay-for-performance which includes VBP and the Hospital Readmission Reduction
Program (HRRP), and MACRA and the Merit-Based Incentive Program (MIPS) which
incentivize physicians (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017c). However, private
payors and hospital systems are now including similar arrangements in individual hospital and
provider contracts (Atkinson, Masiulis, Felgner, & Schumacher, 2010; Caveney, 2016). Thus, it
is important to understand if the pay-for-performance programs are effective. Despite increasing
adoption by payors, one meta-analysis and systematic review found the benefits of pay-forperformance programs to be “modest” to performance improvement and focused
disproportionately on process measures instead of outcomes (Ogundeji, Bland, & Sheldon,
2016). Outcome measures reflect the effects of the care delivered on overall health status, such
as mortality, readmissions, and infection rates (Donabedian, 1966). While outcomes are of
superior importance in the realm of quality measurement, structure and process measures are
important in understanding the conditions of care (Donabedian, 1966). Structure and process
are unmistakably related, however, the relationships between process and outcome, and
between structure and both process and outcome, are not as clear (Donabedian, 1966). This
study will focus on performance as related to outcomes (HACs) and explore their relationship
with structure.
Previous research suggests that structural characteristics of hospitals contribute to being
penalized or not in the HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015).
Hospitals that are large (400 or more beds), academic, have a level I trauma center, or who
have a higher CMI are more often subject to penalty (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015).
Also more frequently penalized are hospitals with safety net status, meaning that the
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organization is part of the highest quartile of disproportionate share (DSH) payments awarded to
large urban hospitals that care for a high proportion of uninsured patients (Rajaram et al., 2015).
Safety-net hospitals are defined as being in the top quartile of DSH patient percentage and
Medicare uncompensated care (UCC) payments per bed are at a greater risk for financial
penalty in both VBP and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, as well (Gilman et al.,
2015). Hospitals performing in the worst quartile are subject to a 1% penalty in reimbursement
for that fiscal/payment year. This can translate to well over a million dollars for a high-revenue
hospital (Rau, 2016). Penalties can be particularly impactful for safety-net hospitals, as some
already operate at low margins and cumulative losses could become detrimental over time,
particularly if losses result in eventual closure (Gilman et al., 2015). Even for small, low-volume
hospitals, closure can restrict access to care for the community affected.
Although previous research has shown hospital characteristics are related to being
penalized by various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah
et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018),
there has been no exploration on how hospitals fare year-to-year. By characterizing the effects
of the HAC Reduction program over time, our results can inform decisions by healthcare policy
stakeholders, such as the general public, policy makers, and technical experts who serve as
advisors to CMS and AHRQ. Although healthcare providers and members of the general public
are often familiar with other, more publicized components of the ACA such as medical insurance
coverage, findings from this study will assist stakeholders in making knowledgeable advocacy
and policy. Advocacy may include participation in CMS public comment opportunities regarding
elements of the ACA affecting hospitals, patients, and healthcare quality standards. This study
intends to provide valuable insight into the role of pay-for performance structures in incentivizing
healthcare quality improvement, which can be leveraged to influence policy makers (Penuel &
Means, 2013). In addition, this study will contribute to the practice of nurse leaders and

HAC REDUCTION PROGRAM

23
Emily Cochran
V00274575
administrators by exploring how nurse-sensitive structural characteristics, such as Magnet
accreditation, contribute to HAC performance.
Innovation
This study is innovative in that it compares performance in the HAC Reduction Program
within and across multiple program years. While research has been conducted with regard to
hospital characteristics (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), measure
validity (Winters et al., 2016), and program reliability (Soltoff et al., 2018) in CMS pay-forperformance programs, studies have so far only been conducted within the same program year,
limiting applicability and the ability to make inferences regarding impact to hospitals and patient
outcomes over time. In addition, the current study’s results will contribute to a growing body of
research on the efficacy and validity of quality measures and pay-for-performance programs
(Ogundeji et al., 2016), which have found inconclusive or conflicting evidentiary support in
improving care in a meaningful and sustainable way (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al.,
2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010).
This study is well-suited for an AHRQ-sponsored National Research Service Award (NRSA)
Individual Postdoctoral Fellowship (F32) grant, PA-17-481, as it aligns with AHRQ’s mission of
making health care safer, higher quality, more accessible, equitable and affordable for all.
Approach
Study Design
The proposed research is a descriptive study involving retrospective, longitudinal
multivariate regression analysis using multiple publicly available datasets. The primary aim of
this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural characteristics and
penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY
2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status
(penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
quality performance (Total HAC Score). Although secondary, retrospective analysis may pose

HAC REDUCTION PROGRAM

24
Emily Cochran
V00274575
methodological concerns associated with procedures used in the primary analysis: i.e. bias,
representativeness, missing data from the primary source, and issues with data linkage (Clarke
& Cossette, 2000; Harron et al., 2017), it is the only means of ascertaining CMS pay-forperformance program performance.
Sample. The sample will include hospitals that were in the CMS HAC Reduction Program
from FY 2015 to FY 2018 for which complete data are available. Any hospital participating in the
Inpatient Prospective Payment System/Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System
is initially qualified for inclusion in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately 3,233 hospitals
will meet these criteria based on initial query of data files necessary for the analysis of the
primary and secondary aims. Hospitals with incomplete data in any one of the three datasets
(Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, Hospital Compare Hospital General
Information file, and CMS Payment Update Impact File) will be omitted. For the primary aim, a
sample size of 3,233 is sufficient to examine hospital structural characteristics associated with
HAC Reduction Program payment penalty. Since the sample size of interest is large and power
is not expected to be an issue (James Stevens, 2002), positive power analysis will be done after
the analysis of the primary and secondary aims to determine power based on the sample and
effect size observed.
Data Sources. Three publicly available data sets will be used in the study. They are the (1)
the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, (2) the Hospital Compare Hospital General
Information file, and (3) the CMS Payment Update Impact File. Both Hospital Compare datasets
are publicly available via the Data.Medicare.gov website Data Archive. The CMS Payment
Update Impact File is also available publicly in multiple formats through the National Bureau of
Economic Research for FY 1986 to most recent FY (Roth, 2017). In addition, a fourth dataset
will be derived via manual data entry from the ANCC Magnet “Find a Facility” website tool
(American Nurses Credentialing Center, 2018). Data for all eligible hospitals will be extracted
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and linked across datasets using hospital CMS Certification Numbers (CCN) to create a single
dataset.
Procedures. In order to begin analysis for the primary and secondary aims, a single dataset
must be constructed with all necessary variables. First, the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction
Program dataset will be used to assess eligible hospital performance across HAC measures
and in the overall program. The binary variable for HAC Reduction Penalty Status is readily
available in Hospital Compare files for FY 2017 and 2018, but will require calculation for FY
2015 and 2016 based on Total HAC Score falling above or below the lowest quartile of
performance for all eligible hospitals (above the lowest quartile indicates status of “no”, below
indicates “yes”). The HAC Reduction Program’s list of participating hospitals for each included
FY will be combined with the CMS Payment Update Impact File and Hospital General
Information files for the corresponding time period using each hospital’s CCN as the unique
identifier. Hospitals included in the HAC Reduction Program, but not included in the CMS
Payment Update Impact File and/or Hospital Compare Hospital General Information file will be
omitted. Hospitals not accredited as Magnet will be retained in the sample, as accreditation will
be used as a descriptive variable. Magnet accreditation status data will require name and
address to be used to link hospitals into the overall dataset, as CCN is not readily available from
the ANCC Magnet website and must be manually matched using Hospital Compare and
American Hospital Association datasets. Binary variables will be created indicating Magnet
designation status for each of the HAC Reduction Program years researched (2015-2018).
The study does not require IRB review, as it does not fall within the regulatory definition of
research involving human subjects as defined by 45 CFR 46.102. The proposed study utilizes
only publicly available data sets, and do not contain any patient information.
Variables
Variables for primary aim. Table 1 lists the variables for the study. The dependent variable
for this analysis is penalty status for any one program year, FY 2015 through 2018. HAC
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Reduction Program Penalty Status is a binary variable (yes/no) within the Hospital Compare
HAC Reduction Program file, which will be used to indicate whether penalty was issued by CMS
to an individual hospital in any program year. Hospital structural characteristics that are
expected to be related to penalty status are outlined in Table 1. Hospital type is described by
CMS as: acute care, children’s, or critical access. A hospital's CMI represents the average
diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for that hospital, which is calculated by summing
the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of discharges; higher
CMI indicates more complex and resource-intensive caseloads (U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, 2018). Admission volume is measured by the average daily census, which
captures the mean number of individuals hospitalized as inpatients; bed size is the number of
licensed beds. Ownership describes who owns the hospital, whether it is owned by the
government (federal, state, local, or hospital district or authority), physicians, is proprietary,
tribal, or voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private) (Roth, 2017).
DSH adjustment is reported as the Disproportionate Share Hospital Patient Percentage
(DPP) as determined from most recent update of the Provider Specific File (PSF) & Social
Security Administration data (Roth, 2017). Hospitals are determined as qualifying for DSH
payments by a formula or by demonstrating that more than 30 percent of their total net inpatient
care revenues come from State and local governments for indigent care not including Medicare
or Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017a). Location has two descriptive
variables: Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) designation (urban or rural; large or other) and
region (New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central,
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, Puerto Rico). ANCC Magnet
designation will be included as an indicator of hospital commitment to nursing excellence, as
Magnet-recognized hospitals are considered to retain superior nursing talent and exhibit better
patient outcomes (American Nurses Association, n.d.). Many HACs are viewed as nursesensitive outcomes; therefore, a hospital structural measure such as Magnet status, which is
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indicative of quality nursing care, is necessary to evaluate the effect of the nursing care on
outcomes such as HAC performance (Jones, 2016). Variables included in the primary aim,
including concepts, variables, operational definitions, sources, and dataset variable names to be
used in analysis are described in Table 1. A binary variable will be constructed to indicate
whether a given hospital had been penalized in any other program year, using a SAS IF-THEN
statement across the included program years (if Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then
Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’). This calculated variable will then be used as an
independent/predictor variable along with hospital characteristic variables.
Variables for secondary aim. Total HAC Score will be used to measure whether a hospital
has improved its performance across program years. Described further in Figure 2, Domain 1
(PSI-90) is worth 15% of the Total HAC Score, whereas Domain 2 (HAI) is worth 85%. Not all
hospitals are scored in both domains or for every measure depending on patient or procedural
volumes, as detailed in Figure 2. In such events, the Total HAC Score will be based exclusively
on the hospital’s Domain 1, or PSI-90 score, as applicable (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2017b).
Of note, for FY 2015 through 2017, Winsorization was not used for the calculation of the
Total HAC Score. Instead, hospitals’ Total HAC Scores were determined points assigned by
relative rank/performance decile only (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017d).
This methodology is further described in Appendix B. Winsorization is a statistical procedure
that involves ranking hospitals on a spectrum from best to worst performing and, “if a hospital’s
measure result falls between the minimum and 5th percentile, CMS sets the hospital’s measure
result equal to the 5th percentile”; “if a hospital’s measure result falls between the 95th
percentile and maximum, CMS sets the hospital’s measure results equal to the 95th percentile”
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). This process is performed to reduce the
effects of extremely high or low measure results (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2017d). Therefore, hospitals cannot directly compare measure scores, the two domain scores,
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and Total HAC Scores between FY 2018 and any previous program years (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Thus, FY 18 will not be included in these analyses for
aim 2.
Although measure specification and definition changes within PSIs and HAIs across
program years and therefore pose challenges with in consistent measurement of HAC
performance over time, the methodology for the calculation of Total HAC Score remained
consistent from program years 2015 to 2017. In light of this, the Total HAC Score will be used to
measure performance improvement or decline over program years for FY 2015 to FY 2017.
Table 1. Variables, operational definitions, sources, and variable names for analysis.
Variable

Operational Definition

Source

Dataset
Variable
Name

Independent Variables for Primary Aim (FY 2015-2018)
Hospital type

Hospital description as acute care, children’s, or critical access by
CMS.

Case mix index

Admission Volume

Average DRG relative weight for each hospital, calculated by
summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and
dividing by the number of discharges and paid under Hospital
Specific Payment rate (Roth, 2017).
Average daily patient census.

Bed Size

Number of beds licensed to hospital.

Ownership

Hospital ownership description: owned by government (federal,
state, local, or hospital district or authority), physician, proprietary,
tribal, voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private).
DSH Patient Percentage as determined from most recent update
of the Provider Specific File & Social Security Administration Data
(Roth, 2017).
1. CMS Core Based Statistical Area designation
categorized by CMS as urban or rural, large, or other.
2. Region categorized as New England, Middle Atlantic,
South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central,
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain,
Pacific, or Puerto Rico.

DSH Adjustment

Location

ANCC Magnet Status

Yes/No, binary variable related to whether the hospital is
accredited with Magnet status for each HAC Reduction Program
year (2015-2018).

Hospital Compare
Hospital General
Information file
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File

Hospital
Type

CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
Hospital Compare
Hospital General
Information file
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File

Average
Daily
Census
BEDS

ANCC

n/a

CMIV

Hospital
Ownership
DSHPCT

REGION,
URGEO

Dependent Variable for Primary Aim (FY 2015-2018) /
Independent Variable for Secondary Aim (FY 2015-2017)
HAC Reduction
Program Status

Yes/No, binary variable related to whether penalty was issued by
CMS.

Hospital Compare
HAC Reduction
Program file

Payment_
Reduction

HAC REDUCTION PROGRAM
Penalty in Any Other
Program Year
(Covariate)

Yes/No covariate binary variable constructed to indicate whether a
given hospital had been penalized in any other program year (if
Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’).
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Calculated

Penalty_In
_Other_Ye
ar

Dependent Variable for Secondary Aim (FY 2015-2017)
Total HAC Score

Total HAC Score based on hospitals’ performance on 6 quality
measures: PSI-90 and NHSN CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI for Colon
Surgery and Abdominal Hysterectomy, MRSA bacteremia, and
Clostridium difficile infection measures. Hospitals with a Total HAC
Score greater than the 75th percentile of the Total HAC Score
distribution are subject to a payment reduction (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b).

Hospital Compare
HAC Reduction
Program file

Total_HAC
_Score

Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CMI = Case Mix Index; DRG = diagnosis-related group; DSH =
Disproportionate Share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; PSI = Patient Safety
Indicator; NHSN = National Health and Safety Network; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheterassociated urinary tract infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus.

Data Analysis and Management Plan
Analytical model selection. For the primary aim, an analytical approach allowing for
multiple independent variables (structural characteristics) and a single, binary dependent
variable (penalty status) was necessary (Kim & Mallory, 2016). The approach must also control
for the covariate of penalty status in any other program year and allow for repeated
measurement of independent and dependent variables for each program year studied (FY
2015-2018). Thus, repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was selected as the
analytical method for the primary aim.
The secondary aim requires an approach appropriate for evaluating the relationship
between a single binary independent variable (hospital penalty status) and a continuous
dependent variable (Total HAC Score) over time (program years FY 2015 to 2017) (Kim &
Mallory, 2016). A one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used for
the secondary aim. SAS software will be used for statistical tests in both aims.
Primary Aim: The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between
hospital structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in
any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018.
Analysis plan for primary aim. A binary logistic regression with repeated measures
ANCOVA will be used to test for a relationship between each hospital characteristic
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(independent variable) and HAC Reduction Program penalty status (dependent variable) for
each program year (2015-2018). In order to assess the relationship between and across these
variables and HAC Reduction Program penalty status, structural variables will be used in a
univariate, then multivariate model. For the multivariate model, the model statement will be
modified to model categorical outcomes with fixed effects and repeated measures, using the
SAS GLIMMIX procedure to account for repeated measurement of the independent and
dependent variables for each program year (Schabenberger, 2005). Univariate testing will be
performed for any variables determined to be confounding in the multivariate model.
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the characteristics of
hospitals penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY 2015 to FY 2018,
which will be tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among
hospital characteristics across all program years. If the p-value is less than the assumed
significance level of α = 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative.
Descriptive statistics including calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the
continuous variables, and counts with frequencies for categorical variables will be used to
describe the characteristics of the sample. Frequencies, proportions, and 95% confidence
intervals will also be used for each categorical group. Data will be assumed normal and
homoscedasticity will be checked graphically. Multicollinearity will be addressed using backward
elimination if any variable is found to have a significant effect on the outcome (penalty status).
Secondary Aim: The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization
status (penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is
related to quality performance (Total HAC Score).
Analysis plan for secondary aim. ANOVA will be used to evaluate the relationship
between hospital penalty (independent variable) and change in Total HAC Score (dependent
variable) across program years FY 2015 to 2017. Descriptive statistics will be used to describe
the sample, including calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the continuous
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variables, and counts with frequencies for categorical variables. Frequencies, proportions, and
95% confidence intervals will also be used for each categorical group.
The null hypothesis for the secondary aim states there is no significant association between
Total HAC Score and penalty status across program years (2015-2017), which will be tested
against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among hospital characteristics
across years. If the p-value is less than the assumed significance level of α = 0.05, our null
hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative. Data will be assumed normal and
homoscedasticity will be checked graphically.
Limitations
There are several limitations in this study, which include the use of secondary data
described previously (Clarke & Cossette, 2000), methodological issues with the original (CMS,
AHRQ, and NHSN) measurements and scoring, elapsed time since the primary data collection
and analysis, and missing data for some hospitals. Methodological changes across program
years in the HAC Reduction Program do not provide for optimal comparison of program results
over time. This could pose the threat of measurement bias (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady,
& Newman, 2013). An additional methodological change is to the PSI-90 Patient Safety
Composite, in which three measures were added and one was removed; weightings of three
PSI measures were also increased, shifting weight from other measures within the composite
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b), and underwent an update in risk
adjustment, or “rebaseline” of the SIR in 2017 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2018b). Finally, data collection and surveillance procedures related to HAI measures has also
been suspected to influence hospital performance (Rau, 2016).
These numerous changes to and challenges with the HAC Reduction Program methodology
apply to all hospitals, giving no one hospital an unfair advantage. In addition, CMS endorses the
comparison of measure scores, domain scores, and Total HAC Scores across all program
years, with the exception of 2018 when the Winsorization scoring method was adopted (Centers
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for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Therefore, the proposed study intends to use the
measures and program methodology as they exist during the program years studied, to achieve
the primary and secondary aims. The researchers acknowledge that the proposed research
assumes validity of each HAC metric in measuring hospital performance, although it has been
controversial (Calderon et al., 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al., 2016).
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Appendix A
NHSN HAI Specifications

CLABSI, CAUTI, MRSA, and C. difficile are captured by NHSN by “date of event” (DOE),
which is the date the first element used to meet an NHSN site-specific infection criterion occurs
for the first time within the seven-day infection window period (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2018a, pp. 2–7). SSI is captured by the date of the procedure by which the infection
originated.
A CAUTI is a urinary tract infection in which an indwelling urinary catheter had been in place
for >2 days and was either present for any portion of the calendar day on the DOE or the
catheter was removed the day before the DOE. The patient must also have had at least one of
the following signs or symptoms: fever (>38.0°C), suprapubic tenderness, costovertebral angle
pain or tenderness, urinary urgency, urinary frequency, or dysuria (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2018a). In addition, the patient must have had a urine culture with no more than
two species of organisms identified, at least one of which is a bacterium of ≥105 colony forming
units/ml (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 7–5).
NHSN defines CLABSI as a laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection where an eligible
bloodstream infection (BSI) organism is identified and an eligible central line is present on the
laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection date of event or the day before (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2018a). Central lines eligible for inclusion been in place for more than
two consecutive calendar days following the first access of the central line, in an inpatient
location, during the admission included in the program (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2018a). Lines are eligible for CLABSI events and remain eligible for CLABSI events
until the day after removal from the body or patient discharge, whichever occurs first. An eligible
organism for inclusion is one that meets the criteria for a laboratory-confirmed bloodstream
infection in NHSN (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 4–6).
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Procedures eligible for SSI surveillance for colon surgery or hysterectomy are defined by

ICD-10 or CPT codes designated for inclusion by NHSN. Procedures require incision of the skin
or mucous membrane and must take place in an operating room (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2018a). Infections included as SSI for colon surgery and hysterectomy must
occur within 30 after the procedure and involve a part of the body, as the HAC Reduction
Program includes only deep incisional and organ/space SSI, which is monitored for a longer
time period than superficial incisional SSI. To qualify as an SSI, the patient must have purulent
drainage, a deep incision that spontaneously dehisces or is intentionally opened or aspirated,
test positive for an organism, and must have had either fever (>38.0°C) or localized tenderness
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 9–10).
MRSA surveillance includes staphylococcus aureus cultured from any specimen that tests
oxacillin-resistant, cefoxitin-resistant, or methicillin-resistant by standard susceptibility testing
methods, or by a laboratory test for MRSA detection from isolated colonies. C. difficile requires
a positive test for the organism. Both MRSA and C. difficile monitored at the overall facility-wide
level for inpatient areas (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a).
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Appendix B

FY 2015, 2016, and 2017 HAC Reduction Program Scoring Methodology (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, n.d.).
FY 2015, 2016, and 2017 Scoring Methodology

The domain weights and measures for FY 2017 were the same as FY 2018. However, in FY 2016, CMS
included only SSI, CLABSI, and CAUTI in Domain 2 and Domain 2 received a weight of 75 percent in the
Total HAC Score. In FY 2015, CMS included only CLABSI and CAUTI in Domain 2 and Domain 2 received
a weight of 65 percent.
In FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017, CMS calculated measure results for each measure for which a
hospital has sufficient data. A performance decile* was then assigned for each measure based on the
hospital’s measure result. For each hospital for each measure, CMS assigned a measure score between 1
and 10 based on the decile in which the hospital’s measure result fell. For hospitals with a non-zero
measure result for a given measure, CMS assigned x points to hospitals that fell within the xth
performance decile, ranging from a minimum of 1 point assigned to hospitals in the first performance
decile (best-performing hospitals) to a maximum of 10 points assigned to hospitals in the tenth
performance decile (worst-performing hospitals)*. Higher scores indicated worse performance.

Refer to the FY 2017 HAC Reduction Program HSR User Guide (PDF-1.2 MB) for more information on the
scoring methodology used for the FY 2017 HAC Reduction Program.
* Hospitals received the minimum of one point for measures with a measure result of zero (vol. 79, FR 28140-28141)
regardless of the performance decile. For example, for the CAUTI measure, if 13 percent of hospitals had an SIR of 0,
one point would be assigned to each of the hospitals and two points would be assigned to the remaining 7 percent of
hospitals in the second decile because their SIR was larger than 0.

Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; SSI = Surgical site infection;
CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheter-associated urinary tract infection.
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Abstract

Objective: The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between hospital
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given
hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. Structural
characteristics included hospital type, case mix index, average daily census, bed size,
ownership, disproportionate share percentage, location, and American Nurses Credentialing
Center Magnet status. The secondary objective of the study was to determine whether a
hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. These objectives were achieved
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using 4 publicly available
data sources. Background: The intention of pay-for-performance programs, including the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid HAC Reduction Program, is to improve the quality of care
delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and
their efficacy in improving care are widely debated. This study was designed to address the gap
in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means of motivating
providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality. Results: Higher average daily
census, disproportionate share percentage, and case mix index were associated with increased
likelihood of receiving a penalty in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately half (49%) of
who did not experience a penalty at all improved their Total HAC Score. 51% of hospitals with 1
year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty
improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with 3 years of penalty improved their Total
HAC Score. Conclusions: Despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to
avoid penalty, the vast majority of hospitals improved their performance over time. This finding
holds promise for value-based reimbursement as a means for improving HAC incidence.
Keywords: pay for performance, healthcare associated infections, healthcare quality
indicators, organization and administration
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Introduction

Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are an issue in healthcare that harms patients and
leads to the extension or complication of care, increased healthcare costs, disability, and even
death (Pittet & Donaldson, 2006). The HAC Reduction Program, implemented in 2014, is a
budget-neutral penalty-only program, existing among several Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS) pay-for-performance structures offering incentives, such as Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP) and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) (Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017c). It is unclear whether the program functions as
intended. The intention of all pay-for-performance programs is to improve the quality, and
therefore value, of care delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-forperformance programs and their efficacy is widely debated (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et
al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al.,
2010). The HAC Reduction Program was created to reduce preventable harm to patients
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).
In the HAC Reduction Program, hospital performance is assessed using several nursesensitive outcomes measures (Burston, Chaboyer, & Gillespie, 2014), including the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) hospitalacquired infections (HAI). More specifically, an overall score is calculated using the AHRQ
Patient Safety Composite measure (PSI-90) and the CDC/NHSN HAI central line-associated
bloodstream infections (CLABSI), catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), surgical
site infections (SSI), methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteremia, and C.
difficile laboratory-identified events.
Cross-sectional studies have found that some hospital structural characteristics are related
to financial penalty in the CMS HAC Reduction Program. Hospitals that are academic medical
centers, with 400 or more beds, have a level I trauma center, a high case mix index (CMI),
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and/or safety net status are more frequently penalized (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al.,
2015; Soltoff et al., 2018). Additional structural characteristics that are associated with poorer
performance in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) include
higher disproportionate share (DSH) percentage, high Medicare and Medicaid patient volume,
for profit status, teaching status , and Joint Commission accreditation (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller
et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). Though American Nurses Credentialing
Center (ANCC) Magnet accreditation has not been explored as a structural characteristic in
relation to the HAC Reduction Program specifically, Magnet accreditation has been associated
with reduced HAC incidence (Barnes, Rearden, & McHugh, 2016; Bergquist-Beringer, Cramer,
Potter, Stobinski, & Boyle, 2018).
Because not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction Program are scored
in every measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2017b), larger hospitals that have higher volumes of qualifying patients and
procedures and also care for a higher proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged populations,
disproportionately receive penalty status (Rajaram et al., 2015). The above studies were all
cross-sectional studies within a single (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al.,
2016; Rajaram et al., 2015) or two program years (Soltoff et al., 2018). The aim/purpose of this
study is to examine how hospitals fare in the HAC reduction program across years. A
longitudinal design studying multiple program years will precipitate a better understanding of
inter-hospital variability and changes in quality which may be linked to participation in the
program (Penuel & Means, 2013), as there is a gap in research related to how hospitals fare in
the program year-to-year.
This study will explore associations between structural characteristics that may influence
processes, which in turn, could impact quality care outcomes as measured in the CMS HAC
Reduction Program. Processes related to HACs will not be examined in this study. The primary
aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural characteristics and
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penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY
2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status
(penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
quality performance (Total HAC Score).
The Conceptual Model
The results from this study inform a growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of
value-based reimbursement as a means to motivate providers and organizations to improve
healthcare quality. The study design was guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of quality :
structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1988). Structure accounts for the care setting;
process considers the actual steps in care administration; and outcome takes into account the
effects of the care delivered on a patient’s overall health status (Donabedian, 1988).
Donabedian introduced that economic efficiency, or valuation, be considered in quality
improvement and proposed that practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare
improvements, as increased cost will not always lead to an equal increase in the quality of care
(Donabedian, 1966). An organization’s structural characteristics can be key to implementing
strategies for improving processes, and thus patient outcomes such as HACs (Donabedian,
1966). Pay-for-performance programs lack the evidence necessary to produce processes for
meaningful and sustainable quality improvements (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013;
Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010).
Methods
Study Design
This is a descriptive study involving retrospective, longitudinal multivariate regression
analysis using multiple publicly available datasets, three available through CMS and one
through ANCC. The primary objective is to examine the relationship between hospital structural
characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction
Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The secondary objective is to determine whether a
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hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years.
Sample. The sample included hospitals that were in the CMS HAC Reduction Program from
FY 2015 to FY 2018 for which complete data were available. Any hospital participating in the
Inpatient Prospective Payment System/Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System
is qualified for inclusion in the HAC Reduction Program. The initial sample size was 3,233 in the
primary objective and 3,382 in the secondary objective. Hospitals with incomplete data in any
one of the three datasets were omitted during data management procedures.
Data Sources. Three publicly available datasets were used in the study. They are (1) the
Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, (2) the Hospital Compare Hospital General
Information file, and (3) the CMS Payment Update Impact File. Both Hospital Compare datasets
were publicly available via the Data.Medicare.gov website Data Archive. The CMS Payment
Update Impact File is available through the National Bureau of Economic Research for FY 1986
to most recent FY (Roth, 2017). In addition, a fourth dataset was created manually from the
ANCC Magnet “Find a Facility” website tool (American Nurses Credentialing Center, 2018).
Each year’s data for all eligible hospitals were extracted and linked across datasets using
hospital CMS Certification Numbers (CCN) to create a single dataset. Variables provided by
each data source are detailed in Appendix A.
Procedures. A single dataset was constructed with all necessary variables through several
steps. First, the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program dataset was used to extract data for
HAC measures and in the overall program for eligible hospitals. The binary variable for HAC
Reduction Penalty Status is already calculated in the in Hospital Compare files for FY 2017 and
2018, but required calculation for FY 2015 and 2016. Therefore, the binary variable was
calculated for FY 2015 and 2016 based on Total HAC Score falling above or below the lowest
quartile of performance for all eligible hospitals (above the lowest quartile indicates status of
“no”, below indicates “yes”). The third step was to combine the HAC Reduction Program dataset
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with the CMS Payment Update Impact File and Hospital General Information files for the
corresponding time period using each hospital’s CCN as the unique identifier. Hospitals
included in the HAC Reduction Program, but not included in the CMS Payment Update Impact
File and/or Hospital Compare Hospital General Information file were omitted. Hospitals not
accredited as Magnet were retained in the sample, as accreditation was used as a descriptive
variable. In the final step, to obtain the Magnet accreditation status, name and address were
used from the Magnet data to link hospitals into the overall/combine dataset, as CCN is not
readily available from the ANCC Magnet website and must be manually matched using Hospital
Compare and American Hospital Association datasets. Binary variables were created indicating
Magnet designation status for each of the HAC Reduction Program years researched (20152018).
Variables. Variables included in the primary and secondary objectives are described in
Appendix A. The figure includes concepts, variable name, operational definitions, sources, and
dataset variable names to be used in analysis. Independent variables for the primary objective
were hospital type, CMI, average daily census, bed size, ownership, DSH adjustment, location,
and ANCC Magnet Status. The dependent variable for the second objective was constructed to
indicate whether a given hospital had been penalized the initial program year studied (2015) in
comparison with the following years (2016-2017) studied. Total HAC Score was used to
measure whether a hospital has improved its performance.
A minor adjustment to the data acquisition plan was necessary during analysis preparation.
Two versions of CMI were available for each HAC Reduction Program year. For example, in FY
2015, CMI version 31 and 32 were available and version 32 was used for analysis; for FY 2016,
version 32 and 33 were available and version 33 was used for analysis, and so on. Different
versions of CMI are based on the DRG grouper logic us year (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2016b); therefore, it was appropriate to proceed with the analysis by
comparing CMI versions across years. For the purpose of this study, only the most recent year
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of CMI available was extracted. Data management completed prior to analysis is detailed in
Appendix B.
Analysis Preparation
Three steps were taken to prepare the data for analysis. First, due to an unanticipated lack
of variation, the variable for hospital type was removed from the model after determining that all
hospitals meeting criteria for inclusion in the dataset were categorized as “acute care hospitals.”
Hospitals with a CMS Certification Number (CCN) available for each of the four years studied in
the primary objective and all three years studied in the secondary objective were then filtered to
include those with complete data for the dependent variable (penalty status for objective 1 and
HAC score for objective 2). Hospitals with no data for penalty status for the primary objective, or
that lacked 2015 or 2017 performance data necessary to calculate total HAC score for the
secondary objective, were excluded. For the secondary objective, at least two Total HAC
Scores are necessary to evaluate a potential difference in Total HAC Score between years.
Thus, 3,399 hospitals were the sample for the primary objective and 3,382 hospitals were the
total sample for the secondary objective, as described in Table 1.
Table 1
Number (n) of Hospitals Included in Each Objective for Each Program Year Studied
2015

2016

2017

2018

Total
Observations
Across Years

All Years

3399

3399

3399

3399

13596

All Years, with Penalty Status Available

3280

3211

3267

3258

13016

3382
3204

3382
3204

3382
3204

n/a
n/a

10146
9612

Primary Objective

Secondary Objective
All Years
All Years, with Total HAC Score for 2015 & 2017

In the second step, since multicollinearity was a concern due to the potential relation of
some structural characteristics, a pairwise comparison of Pearson correlations for noncategorical variables was performed prior to the analysis for the primary objective. A nearly
perfect correlation was observed between average daily census and bed size (r= 0.97).
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Therefore, before proceeding to final model and to check for collinearity, the two variables were
examined in an ANCOVA model first separately and then together. Using bed size alone in the
model, average daily census yielded significant results (F= 318.91, p= <.0001) and a negative
parameter estimate (t= -51.33). Average daily census was also significant if run separately in
the model (F= 204.62, p= <.0001) with a negative parameter estimate (t= -43.10). Together in
the model, both remained significant (average daily census F= 42.95, p= <.0001, bed size F=
10.19, p= 0.0014), but parameter estimates changed substantially (average daily census t=
6.55; bed size t= -3.19) indicating multicollinearity. Therefore, bed size was excluded from the
initial model in favor of average daily census, which more accurately describe patient volumes
rather than facility capacity. No other pairwise Pearson correlations were found to have a
strong, or even moderate, positive or negative correlation by commonly accepted interpretations
(r= less than 0.50 or greater than -0.50) (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003). A matrix of correlation
coefficients is presented in Table 2.
The third and final step was done in preparation for the examination of the secondary
objective. A categorical variable was constructed to indicate how many years a given hospital
had experienced a penalty status of “yes” in the years 2015 through 2017, ranging from values
0-3; 0 indicating hospitals that had not received any penalty in the years studied, 1 indicating
one year of penalty, 2 indicating 2 years of penalty, and 3 indicating 3 years of penalty (penalty
for all included years). A binary variable was then created to indicate whether a given hospital
had a reduction in Total HAC Score for the time period (1, or “yes,” indicates improvement in
Total HAC Score from 2015-2017). Because hospitals cannot directly compare measure scores
after the adoption of Winsorization methodology by CMS, FY 18 results were not included in the
analyses of Total HAC Score for objective 2. Winsorization and related changes are further
detailed in Appendix C.
Results (Chapter IV)
Results for Primary Objective
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The number of hospitals qualifying for and included in each objective for each program year

studied is summarized in Table 1. In each year studied, approximately 2,500 hospitals were
penalized and approximately 750 hospitals were not (see Tables 3 and 4). Average daily census
was substantially higher in hospitals receiving penalty (M= 158.16, SD= 170.49) across the
years studied than those that were not (M= 97.69, SD= 124.33). Similarly, DSH percentage was
higher for penalized hospitals in all four years (M= 0.32, SD= 0.19) than non-penalized hospitals
(M= 0.28, SD= 0.17). CMI was also higher for the penalized group across years (M= 1.62, SD=
0.37) than the group not receiving a penalty (M= 1.53, SD= 0.37).
Hospitals in the South Atlantic region comprised the highest percentage of penalized
hospitals across years 2015 to 2018 (18%), followed by Pacific (15%) and Middle Atlantic (15%)
regions. The majority of hospitals penalized were in the large urban CMS core based statistical
area (CBSA) category (48%); the next highest percentage CBSA category was other urban
(34.3%) across years. Non-Magnet-accredited organizations encompassed the overwhelming
majority of penalized hospitals across years (82-88%). For hospital ownership, privately-owned
voluntary non-profit organizations made up 45% of all penalized hospitals in the time period
studied, followed by proprietary-owned hospitals at 18%.
Next, using the process of backward elimination, hospital structural variables for each year
were included into a binary logistic regression ANCOVA fixed effects model in order to examine
the effect of average daily census, ownership, geographical location, and Magnet accreditation
on penalty status. This initial model yielded significant associations between all the variables
and penalty status, with the exception of Magnet accreditation status (p= 0.5461) and hospital
ownership (p= 0.1002) (see Table 5). Therefore, using the process of backward elimination to
obtain a parsimonious model, Magnet status and hospital ownership were excluded in
subsequent models.
The next ANCOVA model indicated the need to eliminate CBSA (p= 0.0681), which
designates hospitals as large urban, other urban, or rural (see Table 6). Thus, the final
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multivariate model excluding hospital type, Magnet Status, hospital ownership, and CBSA
maintained a significant association between penalty and average daily census (F= 88.56, p
<.0001), DSH percentage (F= 15.82, p <.0001), region, and CMI (F= 13.98, p <.0001). Results
for the final ANCOVA fixed effects model shown in Table 7 and are reported with greater detail
in Table 8, including the categories within each hospital characteristic.
Table 8
Results for Final Fixed Effects Model of Hospital Structural Characteristics, Including Variable
Categories
Fixed Effect

Estimate

Standard
Error

DF

t Value

Pr > |t|

Intercept

-2.2149

0.2011

3346

-11.01

<.0001

Average Daily Census

0.00228

0.000242

9549

9.41

<.0001

Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage

0.7031

0.1768

9549

3.98

<.0001

New England

0.2498

0.1681

9549

1.49

0.1373

Middle Atlantic

0.1346

0.1232

9549

1.09

0.2747

South Atlantic

-0.1667

0.1149

9549

-1.45

0.1467

East North Central

-0.4117

0.1184

9549

-3.48

0.0005

East South Central

-0.51

0.1381

9549

-3.69

0.0002

West North Central

-0.3592

0.1409

9549

-2.55

0.0108

West South Central

-0.4774

0.1169

9549

-4.08

<.0001

Mountain

0.01125

0.1388

9549

0.08

0.9354

Region

Pacific
Case Mix Index (CMI)

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.3701

0.09899

9549

3.74

0.0002

Note. Coefficients of zero due to redundancy are reported “n/a.”

Odds ratios calculated from the parameter estimates indicate that a 1% increase in DSH
doubled the likelihood that a hospital would be penalized, and a 1-unit increase in CMI
demonstrated a 50% increase in the likelihood of hospital penalty. For each 10-patient increase
in average daily census, the odds of hospital penalty increased by 2%. In comparison to
hospitals in the Pacific region, hospitals located in the East North and South Central, West
North and South Central regions demonstrated a significantly lower probability of hospital
penalty than all other regions. The East North Central region contains the states of Wisconsin,
Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio; East South Central contains Kentucky, Tennessee,
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Mississippi, and Alabama; West North Central contains North and South Dakota, Minnesota,
Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri; West South Central includes Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Oklahoma (US Census Bureau, 2000a). A map of regional categorizations can
be found in Appendix D.
Results for Secondary Objective
The secondary objective was to determine whether a hospital's penalization status across
one or more HAC Reduction Program years was related to quality performance (Total HAC
Score). Frequencies and proportions describing the relationship of penalty in any given program
year with whether organizations had a reduction in Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017 are
described in in Table 9. To summarize, 49% of hospitals with no penalty in any year improved
their Total HAC Score; 51% of hospitals with 1 year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score;
54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with
3 years of penalty improved their Total HAC Score.
Table 9
Frequencies and Proportions of the Effect of Penalty in Any Given Program Year on Whether
Organizations Had a Reduction in Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017 (n= 3204).

Total HAC Score
Reduction: No

Total HAC Score
Reduction: Yes

Total

All Hospitals with
Total HAC Score
Reduction: Yes

n

%

n

%

n

%

0 Years of Penalty

959

61.8%

912

55.2%

1871

48.7%

1 Year of Penalty

349

22.5%

361

21.8%

710

50.8%

2 Years of Penalty

177

11.4%

205

12.4%

382

53.7%

3 Years of Penalty
Subtotal for Total HAC
Score Reduction Group

66

4.3%

175

10.6%

241

72.6%

1551

48.4%

1653

51.6%

3204

51.6%

One-way ANOVA testing (see Table 10 in Appendix) indicated there was a significant effect
of hospital's penalization status on subsequent Total HAC scores (df= 3, F= 16.751, p= 0.000).
Because it was of interest if differences existed between hospitals grouped by years of penalty
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(0-3 years), the Tukey adjustment method for comparison between multiple groups was used for
post-hoc testing. Significant differences were found between hospitals having 3 years of penalty
and all other penalty year groups (all p= 0.000). The mean difference in the reduction of Total
HAC Score between hospitals penalized in all 3 years and those not penalized at all was also
significant in relation to other groups (diff= 0.239, p= 0.000). In addition, Total HAC Score
reduction between hospitals receiving penalty 3 years and those receiving penalty 0, 1, and 2
years of the years studied (each 3 pairs) demonstrated a significant relationship.
In summary, the analysis of the data resulted in numerous significant findings. For the
primary objective, increased average daily census, DSH percentage, and CMI were all
associated with significantly higher probability of penalty across years in the HAC Reduction
Program. Regionally, hospitals located in Midwestern states as defined by the US Census
Bureau (US Census Bureau, 2000b) were less likely to be penalized than hospitals located in
other regions. While 49% of hospitals with no penalty improved their Total HAC Score, as years
of penalty increased from 1-3 years, the percentage of hospitals that improved their HAC score
within each group also increased.
Discussion (Chapter V)
The study found significant differences in some structural characteristics of hospitals
penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY 2015 to FY 2018. Further, a
significant association was found between improvement in Total HAC Score for hospitals
receiving penalty for 3 years and whether a hospital was penalized across program years
(2015-2017). The significant relationship between certain structural characteristics and penalty
were similar to results from other cross-sectional studies (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al.,
2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), with differences observed in some characteristics, possibly resulting
from the execution of a longitudinal analysis. This relationship will be discussed further here.
Structural Characteristics (Primary Objective)
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The evaluation of various structural characteristics was key to achieving the primary

objective. Though previous research indicates that hospital structural characteristics are
associated with financial penalty in the HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram
et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018) and performance in the HAC Reduction Program and VBP
(Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015), this study
examined the association between hospital structural characteristics and penalty status across
program years (2015-2018). The study results indicated that increased average daily census,
DSH percentage, and CMI demonstrated a statistically significant association with HAC
Reduction Program penalty across years. Modest increases in DSH percentage and CMI
demonstrated the most significant increase in the odds of a hospital receiving a penalty. Both
DSH percentage and CMI are indicators of patient complexity, and this study’s results are
consistent with findings from previous cross-sectional studies that found hospitals with high
patient volume and procedures and those with a higher proportion of complex and/or
disadvantaged populations are penalized more frequently (Rajaram et al., 2015). Therefore, risk
adjustments currently used could be incomplete. It may be prudent for DSH percentage and
CMI to be incorporated into risk adjustment in the HAC-reduction program and other valuebased reimbursement programs as some have suggested (Fuller et al., 2017).
Region was found in this study to be significantly associated with penalty. Organizations
located in the Midwestern region were less likely to be penalized in the HAC Reduction Program
than hospitals located in other regions. One possible explanation could be that there are fewer
academic medical centers in the Midwest. Academic medical centers have higher proportions of
ICU patients and treat patients with more comorbidities (Burke et al., 2018) and, thus, higher
CMI. With fewer Academic Medical Centers the Midwest regions also have fewer complex
patients and therefore a reduced likelihood of HAC prevalence, and therefore penalty. In the
Midwestern Census area, 71% are nonteaching hospitals compared to 68% in the Northeast,
74% in the West, and 87% in the South (Burke et al., 2018).
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Though HACs are often used as measurements of nursing care, process, and structure

(American Nurses Association, n.d.; Burston et al., 2014), this study used one measure of
nursing structure: ANCC Magnet accreditation status. Magnet status was selected for use in this
study because of its association with reduced HAC incidence (Barnes et al., 2016; BergquistBeringer et al., 2018). It was somewhat surprising that Magnet status, hospital ownership, and
CBSA were not significant, and therefore, not retained in the final model. Hospitals who are
Magnet accredited had been shown in previous research to have lower HAC incidence (Barnes
et al., 2016; Bergquist-Beringer et al., 2018) and hospitals penalized more frequently have been
shown to hold more quality accreditations, such as Joint Commission accreditation (Rajaram et
al., 2015). Previous research has also indicated that penalized hospitals are more likely to be
urban or voluntary non-profit owned (Soltoff et al., 2018). The nonsignificant results in this study
for Magnet status, hospital ownership, and CBSA may be related to the use of a repeated
measures ANCOVA model rather than the cross-sectional logistic regression used in previous
studies, which better detects within-subject change over time and typically has higher statistical
power than cross-sectional designs (Guo, Logan, Glueck, & Muller, 2013).
Penalty Status and Total HAC Score (Secondary Objective)
The findings suggest that hospitals with 3 years of penalty are more likely to have a
reduction in Total HAC Score than hospitals with fewer years of penalty, and the majority of
hospitals demonstrated a reduction in Total HAC Score regardless of the number of years of
penalty. It is possible that public reporting of the HAC Reduction Program results has driven this
reduction over time (James, 2012). Despite the inability of hospitals to avoid penalty while still
reducing their Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017, the vast majority (73%) of hospitals
experiencing penalty in all 3 years did have improved Total HAC Scores. The remaining 27% of
hospitals did not see improvement in Total HAC Score. Reduction in overall Total HAC Scores
is a promising indicator that HAC rates are improving, regardless of penalty status.
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Though the study results do not directly address concerns related to methodological

reliability of the HAC Reduction Program, HAIs, or PSIs as mechanisms of measuring quality
performance (Bysshe et al., 2017; Rau, 2016; Soltoff et al., 2018), the results do imply that the
majority of hospitals are not being unfairly or repeatedly penalized despite improvement in their
Total HAC Scores. The HAC Reduction Program bases the penalty threshold upon the
performance of all eligible hospitals in a given program year, meaning that since hospitals are
improving overall, the penalty threshold will change accordingly. To avoid penalty in the HAC
Reduction Program, hospitals would need to improve at a faster pace than their peers. The
minority of hospitals that do experience penalty may consider prioritizing the robust
implementation of evidence-based HAC prevention practices, such as those offered by CMS,
AHRQ, and CMS toolkits, to prevent sustained penalty in the HAC Reduction Program (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016a; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2017b). In summary, the current study found that Total HAC Score is a valid measurement of
quality improvement related to HAC incidence for the majority of hospitals, an assumption which
has been reportedly controversial (Calderon et al., 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al.,
2016).
Study Limitations
Limitations in this study include methodological changes and issues around missing data,
hospital type, CMI, and Magnet status variables.
Methodological changes. The most significant limitation of this study is that methodological
changes across HAC Reduction Program years do not create the most robust methodological
conditions for comparisons over time. Such methodological changes could precipitate
measurement bias (Hulley et al., 2013). Nonetheless, statisticians contracted by CMS
encourage the comparison of performance across years, with the exception of 2018 when the
Winsorization scoring method was adopted (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2017b) since no hospital is uniquely subjected to the yearly methodological changes. The use of
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a binary variable to indicate whether a reduction in Total HAC Score was achieved for hospitals
between 2015 and 2017 was also suboptimal.
A second methodological limitation is that, though using the Total HAC Score as a
continuous dependent variable was considered, the raw value is not a clinically meaningful
metric. Instead, it is a composite with a changing penalty threshold each year. The Total HAC
Score does not translate directly to a rate or quantification of HAC incidence, rather, it is
directionally indicative of improvement with decline (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, n.d.). Also, since penalty threshold varies from year to year, a Total HAC Score that
indicates good performance relative to other hospitals in one year may result in penalty the next
year if the penalty threshold is set differently for that year. Therefore, there is an opportunity for
more robust and informative future analysis of the HAC Reduction Program that may examine
Total HAC Score as a continuous outcome variable. For example, this might involve calculating
the percent difference between years for all hospitals in relation to the respective benchmark for
each program year.
Missing data. Another limitation is that data for 178 hospitals were not available for analysis
in the secondary objective. It was not feasible to calculate the difference in Total HAC Score
and penalty status for those 178 hospitals in the current study, as those hospitals had missing
Total HAC Scores or penalty status in one or more of the included years. Therefore, these
hospitals may be included in the assignment of relative rank/performance decile used by CMS
to calculate the penalty threshold in any given year (2015 through 2017), but were excluded
from the one-way ANOVA in this study. Although secondary, retrospective analysis may pose
methodological concerns associated with procedures used in the primary data collection and
analysis: i.e. bias, representativeness, missing data from the primary source, and issues with
data linkage (Clarke & Cossette, 2000; Harron et al., 2017), it is the only means of ascertaining
CMS pay-for-performance program performance.
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Hospital type. An important distinction for NHSN HAI surveillance criteria and value-based

reimbursement programs as a whole is hospital type (American Hospital Association, 2014;
Burke et al., 2018; Fernando, Gray, & Gottlieb, 2017; McIlvennan et al., 2015; Peasah, Mckay,
Harman, Al-Amin, & Cook, 2013). Hospital type is whether the hospital is designated as acute
care, children’s, or critical access by CMS; however, it is not stated explicitly in CMS guidelines
that acute care hospitals are the only hospitals subject to payment penalty in the HAC
Reduction Program. Instead, only exempted hospitals and units are described (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). Therefore, an alternative structural characteristic or
variables, such as teaching status or trauma designation, would have been more meaningful
alternatives for inclusion in this study.
CMI. Variation in coding practices among hospitals included in the study may impact the
interpretation of CMI’s effect on penalty status in general. Consistency in CMI versions across
program years was not possible given that several years were studied. Slightly different results
from the model could have been obtained for different CMI versions, which rely on the DRG
grouper version in use during a given HAC Reduction Program year. This lack of consistency
serves as an important reminder that CMI relies heavily upon coding used for billing and
administrative purposes, and variation in coding does impact the appropriate capture of
complications and comorbidities used to determine illness severity (Yang & Reinke, 2006).
While CMI has been used in some similar studies as an indicator of patient complexity (Fuller et
al., 2017; Rajaram et al., 2015), validity concerns with CMI are not addressed in those studies.
Magnet status. Magnet accreditation status is publicly available, unlike many other nursing
structural measures such as staffing level, nurse-to-patient ratios, training resources, or
facilities; however, Magnet status may not be wholly reliable as a single measure of nursing
structure. There is a strong body of literature establishing relationships between increased
nurse staffing (B. Mitchell, Gardner, Stone, Hall, & Pogorzelska-Maziarz, 2018), good nurse
work environments (Kelly, Kutney-Lee, Lake, & Aiken, 2013), and nurse specialty certifications
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(Boyle, 2017) with reduced HAC rates. Magnet hospitals are also characteristically large,
academic medical centers in urban locations (Friese, Xia, Ghaferi, Birkmeyer, & Banerjee,
2015). Since Magnet status was not significant and eliminated from the model early in the
analysis, additional, more specific measures of nursing structure may have yielded greater
sensitivity to nursing care and subsequently different results.
Implications for Future Research
Implications for healthcare administration. The results from this study have potential
applications for healthcare administration related to the scopes of safety culture, leadership, and
the contribution of nursing care in HAC prevention, as leadership and culture play an integral
role in successful organizational quality and safety improvement (Berwick, 2008; Kaplan,
Provost, Froehle, & Margolis, 2012; Lanham, 2013; Lukas et al., 2007). Structural
characteristics driving organizational change such as mission, vision, and strategy, operational
functions and processes, and infrastructure are foundational in organizational safety culture
(Lukas et al., 2007; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Leadership culture, teamwork, and a spirit of
continuous organizational improvement are key elements of improving patient safety and quality
metrics, including HACs. These elements overlap considerably with the dimensions of the
AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, which has demonstrated overall acceptable
psychometric properties as a measure of overall organizational safety culture (Sorra & Dyer,
2010). Additionally, evidence has shown that higher scores on the AHRQ Hospital Survey on
Patient Safety Culture are correlated with better patient outcomes (DiCuccio, 2015), including
HACs (Reis, Paiva, & Sousa, 2018).
The publicly available hospital characteristics such as those included in the current study
allow for convenient and standardized quality assessment; however, many popular sources
available free of cost do not capture organizationally-established measures of structure,
process, and outcomes. Future research on this topic should investigate organizational
leadership and safety culture in relation to HACs or leveraging mixed methods by integrating
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qualitative surveys with publicly reported data, such as the AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture.
Policy implications. The results from this study offer several implications to policy and
factors to consider for future research, including the impact of the methodology and efficacy of
value-based reimbursement program. First, this study emphasizes the importance and impact of
controlling for hospital structural characteristics in data analyses used for the development of
policy, such as the ACA, under which the HAC Reduction Program was legislated. Differences
in methodological approaches are an important policy consideration when hospital performance
is measured and simplified for public consumption (for example, Leapfrog Safety Scores or
CMS Star Ratings) (James, 2012). Although the methodology used within programs is not
legislated, public reporting is (James, 2012). Certain standards of validation and reliability
should be considered to be mandated with the public reporting of hospital performance, as
accuracy has been and remains a major concern for providers (James, 2012).
The principles underpinning value-based reimbursement programs and policies, that penalty
or reward will incentivize the improvement of quality and safety, has been wrought with
controversy (American Hospital Association, 2014; Association of American Medical Colleges,
2014; de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016;
Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2015). The current
study does not precipitate any conclusions regarding the efficacy of pay-for-performance
policies as a whole, but does indicate that penalties associated with the HAC Reduction
Program may drive improvement in HACs across the board, regardless of penalty status.
Additional research is needed to better understand policies and other mechanisms by which
hospitals can be motivated to improve and sustain improved performance.
Conclusion (Chapter V)
This study explored hospital structural characteristics as related to both penalty status and
HAC performance, across program years. Additionally, the study determined whether a
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hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to
HAC performance. The study found that, with increasing average daily census, DSH
percentage, and CMI, hospitals were more likely to be penalized in the program. Regional
differences were observed, with hospitals located geographically in the Midwest demonstrating
less likelihood of receiving HAC Reduction Program penalty. This study’s results suggest that,
despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to avoid penalty, the majority of
hospitals improved their Total HAC Score across the years studied. This finding suggests that
hospitals are not being unfairly or repeatedly penalized despite improvement in their Total HAC
Scores, potentially indicating an encouraging reduction of HAC incidence, or outcomes, across
the country.
Numerous implications of this research were identified in the areas of organizational
administration and healthcare policy. An organization or hospital’s mission, vision, and strategy,
as well as operational infrastructure can have a tremendous impact on the ability to improve
quality and safety for patients. Though some pay-for-performance programs are mandated to
measure quality, more care should be taken to ensure that ensure that metrics are
methodologically sound and account for key structural characteristics such as DSH percentage
and CMI, especially where performance is reported for public consumption.
Given the numerous limitations of this study, accurate measurement of quality pertaining to
healthcare delivery is paramount in ensuring that value-based reimbursement policies are
meaningful to providers and patients. Measurement and instrumentation related to quality in
healthcare and nursing are perhaps the most challenging aspects of achieving effective pay-forperformance strategies: primary data sources are rarely available and secondary sources
sometimes leave much to be desired. With regard to the foundational principles of value-based
reimbursement, there is a substantial gap in the availability of reliable nursing-sensitive quality
indicators; still, nursing care is the mainstay of our nation’s healthcare system. It is essential that
we better understand the modalities by which positive change is facilitated and how such
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change can be rewarded in order to reduce patient harm and improve the health and well-being
of the population.
Value-based reimbursement policy remains a promising area of research as healthcare and
nursing experts strive to understand the how care quality can be measured and incentivized.
Quality improvement, systems, organizational, and behavioral economics theories are the
underlying framework for pay-for-performance, but inspire debate surrounding efficacy in
improving patient outcomes for researchers, policy experts, providers, and organizations.
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Appendices (Manuscript)
Appendix A

Variables, operational definitions, sources, and variable names for analysis.
Variable

Operational Definition

Source

Dataset
Variable
Name

Independent Variables for Primary Objective (FY 2015-2018)
Hospital type

Hospital description as acute care, children’s, or critical access by
CMS.

Case mix index

Average Daily Census

Average DRG relative weight for each hospital, calculated by
summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and
dividing by the number of discharges and paid under Hospital
Specific Payment rate (Roth, 2017).
Average daily patient census.

Bed Size

Number of beds licensed to hospital.

Ownership

Hospital ownership description: owned by government (federal,
state, local, or hospital district or authority), physician, proprietary,
tribal, voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private).
DSH Patient Percentage as determined from most recent update
of the Provider Specific File & Social Security Administration Data
(Roth, 2017).
1. CMS Core Based Statistical Area designation
categorized by CMS as urban or rural, large, or other.
2. Region categorized as New England, Middle Atlantic,
South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central,
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain,
Pacific, or Puerto Rico.

DSH Adjustment

Location

ANCC Magnet Status

Yes/No, binary variable related to whether the hospital is
accredited with Magnet status for each HAC Reduction Program
year (2015-2018).

Hospital Compare
Hospital General
Information file
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File

Hospital
Type

CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
Hospital Compare
Hospital General
Information file
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File
CMS Payment
Update Impact
File

Average
Daily
Census
BEDS

ANCC

n/a

CMI

Hospital
Ownership
DSHPCT

REGION,
URGEO

Dependent Variable for Primary Objective (FY 2015-2018) /
Independent Variable for Secondary Objective (FY 2015-2017)
HAC Reduction
Program Status

Yes/No, binary variable related to whether penalty was issued by
CMS.

Penalty in Any Other
Program Year
(Covariate)

Yes/No covariate binary variable constructed to indicate whether a
given hospital had been penalized in any other program year (if
Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’).

Hospital Compare
HAC Reduction
Program file
Calculated

Payment_
Reduction
Penalty_In_
Other_Year

Dependent Variable for Secondary Objective (FY 2015-2017)
Total HAC Score

Total HAC Score based on hospitals’ performance on 6 quality
measures: PSI-90 and NHSN CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI for Colon
Surgery and Abdominal Hysterectomy, MRSA bacteremia, and
Clostridium difficile infection measures. Hospitals with a Total HAC
Score greater than the 75th percentile of the Total HAC Score
distribution are subject to a payment reduction (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b).

Hospital Compare
HAC Reduction
Program file

Total_HAC
_Score

Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CMI = Case Mix Index; DRG = diagnosis-related group; DSH =
Disproportionate Share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; PSI = Patient Safety
Indicator; NHSN = National Health and Safety Network; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheterassociated urinary tract infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus.
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Appendix B

Data Analysis and Management Plan
Each study objective requires a different analytical and data management approach. SAS
software will be used for statistical tests in both objectives. Post hoc power analysis will not be
necessary, as effect size was considered large due to the sample size (>100) in both objectives,
and nonsignificant results indicating potential Type II error were not present (James Stevens,
2002).
Primary Objective
For the primary objective, an analytical approach allowing for multiple independent variables
(structural characteristics) and a single, binary dependent variable (penalty status) for each
program year is necessary (Kim & Mallory, 2016). The approach must control for the covariate
of penalty status in any other program year and allow for repeated measurement of independent
and dependent variables for each program year studied (FY 2015-2018). Thus, a binary logistic
regression with repeated measures ANCOVA will be used to test for a relationship between
each hospital characteristic (independent variable) and HAC Reduction Program penalty status
(dependent variable) for each program year (2015-2018). In order to assess the relationship
between and across these variables and HAC Reduction Program penalty status, structural
variables will be used in a univariate, then multivariate model. Descriptive statistics including
calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the continuous variables, and counts
with frequencies for categorical variables will be used to describe the characteristics of the
sample.
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the characteristics of
hospitals penalized versus not penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY
2015 to FY 2018, which will be tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an
association among hospital characteristics across all program years. If the p-value is less than
the assumed significance level of α = 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the
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alternative. Frequencies, proportions, and 95% confidence intervals will be used for each
categorical group. Data will be assumed normal and homoscedasticity will be checked
graphically. Multicollinearity will be addressed using backward elimination if any variable is
found to have a significant effect on the outcome (penalty status).
Secondary Objective
The secondary objective requires an approach appropriate for evaluating the relationship
between a single binary independent variable (hospital penalty status) and a continuous
dependent variable (Total HAC Score) over time (program years FY 2015 to 2017) (Kim &
Mallory, 2016). A general linear mixed model will be used for the secondary objective.
Themodel statement will be modified to model categorical outcomes with fixed effects and
repeated measures, using the SAS GLIMMIX procedure to account for repeated measurement
of the independent and dependent variables for each program year (Schabenberger, 2005).
Univariate testing will be performed for any variables determined to be confounding in the
multivariate model.
The null hypothesis for the secondary objective states there is no significant association
between Total HAC Score and penalty status across program years (2015-2017), which will be
tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among hospital
characteristics across years. If the p-value is less than the assumed significance level of α =
0.05, our null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative. Data will be assumed normal
and homoscedasticity will be checked graphically.
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Appendix C

Winsorization and Consistency in HAC Reduction Program Methodology
Of note, for FY 2015 through 2017, Winsorization was not used for the calculation of the
Total HAC Score. Instead, hospitals’ Total HAC Scores were determined points assigned by
relative rank/performance decile only (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017d).
This methodology is further described in Appendix B. Winsorization is a statistical procedure
that involves ranking hospitals on a spectrum from best to worst performing and, “if a hospital’s
measure result falls between the minimum and 5th percentile, CMS sets the hospital’s measure
result equal to the 5th percentile”; “if a hospital’s measure result falls between the 95th
percentile and maximum, CMS sets the hospital’s measure results equal to the 95th percentile”
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). This process is performed to reduce the
effects of extremely high or low measure results (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2017d).
Although measure specification and definition changes within PSIs and HAIs across
program years and therefore pose challenges with in consistent measurement of HAC
performance over time, the methodology for the calculation of Total HAC Score remained
consistent from program years 2015 to 2017. In light of this, the Total HAC Score was used to
measure performance improvement or decline over program years for FY 2015 to FY 2017.
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Appendix D

Census Regions and Divisions of the United States Map (US Census Bureau, 2000b),
identifying areas included in each category of the variable “region” for the primary objective.

Note: Variables numbered: 1= New England; 2= Middle Atlantic; 3= South Atlantic; 4= East North Central; 5= East
South Central; 6= West North Central; 7= West South Central; 8= Mountain; 9= Pacific; 40= Puerto Rico.
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Tables (Manuscript)

Table 2
Pairwise Pearson Correlations for Non-categorical Variables
Average
Penalty
Daily
Bed Size
Status
Census
Penalty Status
1
0.183
0.167
Average Daily Census
0.183
1
0.970
Bed Size
0.167
0.970
1
Disproportionate Share
0.078
0.189
0.205
(DSH) Percentage
Case Mix Index (CMI)
0.091
0.406
0.405
Region
-0.028
-0.111
-0.084
Magnet Status
0.074
0.379
0.356

DSH %

CMI

Region

Magnet
Status

0.078
0.189
0.205

0.091
0.406
0.405

-0.028
-0.111
-0.084

0.074
0.379
0.356

1

-0.070

0.171

-0.045

-0.070
0.171
-0.045

1
0.193
0.216

0.193
1
-0.087

0.216
-0.087
1

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals Grouped as Not Penalized for each HAC Reduction Program Year Studied, 2015 to 2018.
Hospitals Not Penalized
Hospital Characteristics

2015

Average Daily Census (mean, SD)
Bed size (mean, SD)
DSH Percentage (mean, SD)
Case Mix Index (CMI) (mean, SD)
CBSA (n, %)
Large urban
Other urban
Rural
Not Available
Total

2016

2017

2018

Total for All Years

96.85
173.59
0.28
1.50

121.62
169.48
0.17
0.35

100.16
180.11
0.28
1.54

121.93
171.44
0.17
0.34

90.03
166.44
0.29
1.52

118.48
167.66
0.18
0.39

103.74
182.08
0.29
1.58

134.37
183.46
0.18
0.41

97.69
175.53
0.28
1.53

124.33
173.20
0.17
0.37

982
856
718
2
2558

38%
33%
28%
0%
100%

976
825
663
0
2464

40%
33%
27%
0%
100%

924
849
708
18
2499

37%
34%
28%
1%
100%

961
890
636
22
2509

38%
35%
25%
1%
100%

3843
3420
2725
42
10030

38%
34%
27%
0%
100%
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426
54
553
3
1522
0
2558

17%
2%
22%
0%
59%
0%
100%

397
48
543
4
1472
0
2464

16%
2%
22%
0%
60%
0%
100%

413
52
557
4
1452
21
2499

17%
2%
22%
0%
58%
1%
100%

369
65
543
2
1515
15
2509

15%
3%
22%
0%
60%
1%
100%

1605
219
2196
13
5961
36
10030

16%
2%
22%
0%
59%
0%
100%

2558

100%

2464

100%

2499

100%

2509

100%

10030

100%

Total

215
2276
67
2558

8%
89%
3%
100%

218
2215
31
2464

9%
90%
1%
100%

224
2248
27
2499

9%
90%
1%
100%

267
2242
0
2509

11%
89%
0%
100%

924
8981
125
10030

9%
90%
1%
100%

Total

96
267
434
397
254
206
452
159
291
2
2558

4%
10%
17%
16%
10%
8%
18%
6%
11%
0%
100%

85
258
434
391
253
194
411
161
277
0
2464

3%
10%
18%
16%
10%
8%
17%
7%
11%
0%
100%

92
236
387
400
255
221
428
184
278
18
2499

4%
9%
15%
16%
10%
9%
17%
7%
11%
1%
100%

99
254
381
410
227
220
424
179
293
22
2509

4%
10%
15%
16%
9%
9%
17%
7%
12%
1%
100%

372
1015
1636
1598
989
841
1715
683
1139
42
10030

4%
10%
16%
16%
10%
8%
17%
7%
11%
0%
100%

Total
Hospital Type (n, %)
Acute Care
Magnet Status (n, %)
Accredited
Not Accredited
Not Available

Region (n, %)
New England
Middle Atlantic
South Atlantic
East North Central
East South Central
West North Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Not Available

Note. DSH= Disproportionate Share; CBSA= CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals Grouped as Penalized for each HAC Reduction Program Year Studied, 2015 to 2018.
Hospitals Penalized
Hospital Characteristics

2015

Average Daily Census (mean, SD)
Bed size (mean, SD)
DSH Percentage (mean, SD)
Case Mix Index (CMI) (mean, SD)

2017

2018

Total for All Years

168.01
263.82
0.31
1.63

170.90
222.56
0.19
0.34

158.88
251.38
0.31
1.63

177.52
226.07
0.19
0.37

172.79
269.06
0.32
1.63

173.59
225.05
0.20
0.38

132.96
215.41
0.33
1.58

156.75
203.12
0.20
0.39

158.16
249.91
0.32
1.62

170.49
220.30
0.19
0.37

Total

357
254
111
0
722

49%
35%
15%
0%
100%

353
264
128
2
747

47%
35%
17%
0%
100%

391
263
104
10
768

51%
34%
14%
1%
100%

333
242
161
13
749

44%
32%
21%
2%
100%

1434
1023
504
25
2986

48%
34%
17%
1%
100%

Total

139
6
126
0
449
2
722

19%
1%
17%
0%
62%
0%
100%

120
9
126
0
492
0
747

17%
1%
17%
0%
66%
0%
100%

111
13
136
1
502
5
768

15%
2%
18%
0%
65%
1%
100%

143
8
159
3
436
0
749

20%
1%
21%
0%
58%
0%
100%

513
36
547
4
1879
7
2986

71%
1%
18%
0%
63%
0%
100%

722

100%

747

100%

768

100%

749

100%

2986

100%

96
606
20
722

13%
84%
3%
100%

114
623
10
747

15%
83%
1%
100%

135
626
7
768

18%
82%
1%
100%

89
660
0
749

12%
88%
0%
100%

434
2515
37
2986

15%
84%
1%
100%

CBSA (n, %)
Large urban
Other urban
Rural
Not Available

Hospital Ownership (n, %)
Government (all)
Physician
Proprietary
Tribal
Voluntary non-profit (all)
Not Available
Hospital Type (n, %)
Acute Care
Magnet Status (n, %)
Accredited
Not Accredited
Not Available
Total
Region (n, %)

2016
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39
102
124
101
47
56
73
73
107
0
722

5%
14%
17%
14%
7%
8%
10%
10%
15%
0%
100%

49
105
123
99
40
59
90
63
117
2
747

7%
14%
16%
13%
5%
8%
12%
8%
16%
0%
100%

Note. DSH= Disproportionate Share; CBSA= CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)

42
129
136
95
44
41
102
50
119
10
768

5%
17%
18%
12%
6%
5%
13%
7%
15%
1%
100%

34
109
140
88
71
39
97
52
106
13
749

5%
15%
19%
12%
9%
5%
13%
7%
14%
2%
100%

164
445
523
383
202
195
362
238
449
25
2986

5%
15%
18%
13%
7%
7%
12%
8%
15%
1%
100%
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Table 5
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type and Bed Size
Effect
Num DF
Den DF
F Value
Pr > F
Average Daily Census
1
9492
53.01
<.0001
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage
1
9492
12.12
0.0005
Hospital Ownership
9
9492
1.63
0.1002
Region
8
9492
6.55
<.0001
Case Mix Index
1
9492
13.96
0.0002
CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)
2
9492
3.42
0.0327
Magnet Status
1
9492
0.36
0.5461

Table 6
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type, Magnet Status,
and Hospital Ownership
Effect

Num DF

Den DF

F Value

Pr > F

Average Daily Census

1

9547

77.39

<.0001

Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage

1

9547

15.61

<.0001

Region

8

9547

6.91

<.0001

Case Mix Index (CMI)

1

9547

9.32

0.0023

CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)

2

9547

2.69

0.0681

Table 7
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type, Magnet Status,
Hospital Ownership, and CBSA
Effect
Num DF
Den DF
F Value
Pr > F
Average Daily Census
1
9549
88.56
<.0001
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage
1
9549
15.82
<.0001
Region
8
9549
7.98
<.0001
Case Mix Index (CMI)
1
9549
13.98
0.0002
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Table 10
Tukey Post Hoc Test Comparing Multiple Groups of Number of Years of Penalty within the Secondary
Objective
95% Confidence Interval
Mean
Group 1: #
Group 2: #
Difference
p
Years of
Years of
Std. Error
(Years of
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Penalty
Penalty
Penalty)

0

1

2

3

1
2

-0.021
-0.049

0.022
0.028

0.772
0.290

-0.08
-0.12

0.04
0.02

3

-.239*

0.034

0.000

-0.33

-0.15

0

0.021

0.022

0.772

-0.04

0.08

2

-0.028

0.031

0.807

-0.11

0.05

3

-.218*

0.037

0.000

-0.31

-0.12

0

0.049

0.028

0.290

-0.02

0.12

1

0.028

0.031

0.807

-0.05

0.11

3

-.189*

0.041

0.000

-0.29

-0.08

0

.239*

0.034

0.000

0.15

0.33

1

.218*

0.037

0.000

0.12

0.31

2

.189*

0.041

0.000

0.08

0.29

Note. *The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Chapter VI: Concluding Narrative
The design of the study described in this dissertation was selected based on existing
research related to this topic, guided also by philosophical and theoretical underpinnings related
to value-based reimbursement. The process of identifying gap in existing literature, selecting a
conceptual model, and developing a grant proposal and manuscript are further described here
in a concluding narrative.
Gap in Existing Literature
There is a strong body of evidence indicating that additional research is necessary to fully
explore the effects of pay-for-performance on the quality of care delivered (de Bruin et al., 2011;
Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017;
Ogundeji et al., 2016; Tao, Agerholm, & Burström, 2016; Van Herck et al., 2010). Pay-for
performance programs developed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
and commercial payors have been developed to incentivize quality and safety performance for
hospitals and providers, but whether these programs achieve their intent is debated. One metaanalysis and systematic review found the benefits of pay-for-performance programs to be
“modest” to quality improvement and focused disproportionately on process measures instead
of outcomes (Chee, Ryan, Wasfy, & Borden, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 2016). Another study found
penalties for hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are attributed to chance alone, given poor
reliability of statistical procedures within the related CMS program (Koenig et al., 2016).
Behavioral economists and social psychologists suggest that monetary incentives actually
“undermine motivation and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks” such as those in
healthcare, in which intrinsic motivation is high (Himmelstein, Ariely, & Woolhandler, 2014b, p.
203).
Organizational structural characteristics play an important role in how facilities fare in quality
performance programs and value-based reimbursement (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al.,
2015). Experts in the area of pay-for-performance argue that these incentive or penalty models
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should be carefully piloted in and evaluated in various organizational settings before adoption in
order to maximize payment without diminishing providers’ intrinsic or altruistic motivations to
care for patients (Conrad, 2015).
Although previous research has shown hospital characteristics are related to being
penalized by various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah
et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018),
there has been no exploration on how hospitals fare programs year-to-year. By characterizing
the effects of the HAC Reduction program over time, the results of this study may inform
decisions by healthcare policy stakeholders, such as the general public, policy makers, and
technical experts who serve as advisors to CMS and AHRQ. This study was designed to
address the gap in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means
of motivating providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality.
Conceptual Model Selection
The conceptual model for this study was chosen based on positivist and mid-range theories,
drawing from both need for empirical validation of health policy phenomena (Crotty, 1998) and
the need to classify performance at the organization level based on care delivered at the patient
level (Liehr & Smith, 2016). Such supporting theories include agency theory, value theory, and
behavioral economics.
The conceptual model offering the most alignment with underlying theories is Donabedian’s
Model of Healthcare Quality Improvement, which involves a three-pronged approach to
assessing quality of care: evaluation of structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1988).
Structure accounts for the care setting; process considers the actual steps in care
administration; outcome takes into account the effects of the care delivered on overall health
status (Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian introduced that valuation be considered in quality
improvement. He suggested that practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare
improvements, as increased cost will not always lead to an equal increase in quality of care
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(Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian’s theory can be related to almost any aspect of quality
improvement research, particularly the efficacy of pay-for performance programs, as related
quality metrics very frequently measure outcomes and value (which according to Donabedian, is
the summation of structure and process in an organization).
Other frameworks were considered by the student, such as the quality health outcomes
model, which is based upon Donabedian’s work and suggests indicators can be dynamic and
interact upon one another in a reciprocal fashion (P. H. Mitchell, Ferketich, & Jennings, 1998).
This model was not used because the research question focused on structure and outcome
only. The Model for Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ) is a model developed by a
panel of quality improvement experts that delineates key factors that influence the success of
quality improvement projects and related contextual factors from the micro to macrosystem level
(Kaplan et al., 2012). The MUSIQ could potentially be leveraged for future applications in the
student’s program of research because it accounts for interactions and relationships between
the organization, quality improvement team, microsystem (departments or units), and culture of
leadership, staff, and project sponsors (Kaplan et al., 2012).
Proposal and Manuscript
A grant proposal and manuscript were developed to explain the study design and report the
findings for this dissertation. Using existing research, the study examined the relationship
between hospital structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized)
in any given hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018
and to determine whether a hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction
Program years is related to quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. A grant
proposal, which serves as Chapters I-III of the dissertation, was written to explore this topic
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using multiple publicly
available data sources.
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The manuscript serves as Chapters IV-V and was written for submission to Quality

Management in Healthcare, which has published over 65 articles related to pay-forperformance, including some in relation specifically to nursing implications. Articles accepted by
Quality Management in Healthcare are focused on “organizational structure and processes as
these affect the quality of care and patient outcomes” (Quality Management in Healthcare,
2019) . Content must build knowledge about the statistical tools used in the evaluation of care
and patient outcomes, evaluate strategies designed to substantiate quantifiable quality
improvements, facilitate collaboration between providers and payors or regulators in pursuit of
improved patient outcomes, and explore links among the administrative and managerial aspects
of patient care and organizational quality governance (Quality Management in Healthcare,
2019). This study is aligned with these objectives because it evaluates the relationship between
hospital structure and patient outcomes in a program initiated by an entity which is both a payor
and regulator.
The manuscript details the methods, findings and discussion for the work proposed in
Chapters I-III. The study explored hospital structural characteristics related to both penalty
status and HAC performance, across program years. In addition, whether a hospital's
penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to HAC
performance was studied. The study found that with increasing average daily census, DSH
percentage, and CMI, hospitals were more likely to be penalized in the program. Regional
differences were observed, with hospitals located geographically in the Midwest demonstrating
less likelihood of receiving HAC Reduction Program penalty. The majority of hospitals improved
their Total HAC Score across the years studied, which is indicative of a potential downward
trend in HAC incidence across the country.
Implications
Several implications for healthcare administration and healthcare policy were identified in
this study. With regard to healthcare administration, an organization’s infrastructure, including
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the structural characteristics included in this study, can have a substantial impact on the ability
of an organization to improve quality and safety for patients. Structural characteristics can also
include mission, vision, and strategy, operational functions and processes. Leadership culture,
teamwork, and a spirit of continuous organizational improvement are key elements of improving
patient safety and quality metrics, including HACs. Because the ability of an organization to
improve is multifaceted, future research could study leadership and safety culture in relation to
HACs or leveraging mixed methods by integrating qualitative surveys with publicly reported
data.
Another implication, related to healthcare policy, is that this study underscores the
significance of controlling for hospital structural characteristics in data analyses used for the
development of healthcare policies, such as the Affordable Care Act, under which the HAC
Reduction Program and public quality reporting were legislated. The principles underpinning
value-based reimbursement programs and policies and public reporting of quality data have
been controversial. The methodology used in value-based programs and in public reporting
should be very robust, and legislation should insist upon the utmost accuracy and integrity of
publicly reported quality data. That said, it is possible that public reporting of HAC data could be
responsible for the overall decline in HACs observed across program years in this study.
Conclusion
The use of value-based reimbursement programs as a method of motivating providers and
organizations to improve healthcare quality provided an opportunity for additional research,
particularly related to how organizations fare programs like the HAC Reduction Program over
time. A grant proposal was written to serve as Chapters I-III of the student’s dissertation, using
Donabedian’s structure, process, and outcome as the guiding conceptual model. The model
selection was informed by value theory, agency theory, and behavioral economics. The study
was designed was a retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using
secondary, public data sources. The proposal required some minor adjustments during the
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analysis, which are detailed with the results of the study in the manuscript serving as Chapters
IV-V. Ultimately, the study found that most hospitals improved their Total HAC Score across the
years studied, regardless of penalty status. This indicates that the HAC Reduction Program,
though perhaps indirectly through public reporting, may be reducing HAC incidence. Because
several characteristics (average daily census, DSH percentage, and CMI) were significantly
associated with penalty, policy makers should consider enhancing risk adjustment methods in
the HAC Reduction Program to adjust for hospital structural characteristics such as these, which
represent the acuity and complexity of patients.
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